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on the computation of equilibria [36] . Analyzing the computational power of learning dynamics in games has been of particular interest (see, e.g., [2, 6, 26, 37] ). Our work creates another link between game theory and computer science by drawing on two previously disjoint areas, self-stabilization in distributed computing theory and game dynamics, to explore broader classes of dynamics operating in adversarial distributed environments.
Adaptive heuristics. Much work in game theory and economics deals with adaptive heuristics (see [20] and references therein). Generally speaking, this long line of research explores the "convergence" of simple and myopic rules of behavior (e.g., best-response/fictitious-play/no-regret dynamics) to an "equilibrium." However, with few exceptions (see below), such analysis has so far primarily concentrated on synchronous environments in which steps take place simultaneously or in some other predetermined order. In this work, we explore dynamics of this type in asynchronous environments, which are more realistic for many applications.
Game-theoretic work on asynchronous environments. Some game-theoretic work on repeated games considers "asynchronous moves." Often, as in Marden and Shamma [31] , this asynchrony merely indicates that players are not all activated at each time step and thus is used to describe environments where only one player is activated at a time ("alternating moves") or where there is a probability distribution that determines which player(s) are activated at each timestep. Other work does not explore the behavior of dynamics but has other research goals (e.g., characterizing equilibria, establishing folk theorems); see [29, 42] , among others, and references therein. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effects of asynchrony (in the broad distributed computing sense) on the convergence of game dynamics to equilibria.
Fault-tolerant computation.
We use ideas and techniques from work in distributed computing on protocol termination in asynchronous computational environments where nodes and communication channels are possibly faulty. Protocol termination in such environments, initially motivated by multi-processor computer architectures, has been extensively studied in the past three decades [3, 4, 9, 15, 23, 39] , as nicely surveyed in [14, 30] . Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [15] showed, in a landmark article, that a broad class of failure-resilient consensus protocols cannot provably terminate. Intuitively, the risk of protocol non-termination in that work stems from the possibility of failures; a computational node cannot tell whether another node is silent due to a failure or is simply taking a long time to react. Our non-convergence result, by contrast, applies to failurefree environments. In game-theoretic work that incorporated fault tolerance concepts, Abraham et al. [1] studied equilibria that are robust to defection and collusion.
Self-stabilization. The concept of self-stabilization is fundamental to distributed computing and dates back to Dijkstra 1974 [8] (see [10] and references therein). Convergence of dynamics to an "equilibrium" in our model can be viewed as the self-stabilization of such dynamics (where the "equilibrium points" are the legitimate configurations). Our formulation draws ideas from work in distributed computing (e.g., Burns' distributed daemon model [5] ) and in networking research [17] on self-stabilization.
Applications.
We discuss the implications of our non-convergence result across a wide variety of applications, that have previously been studied: convergence of game dynamics (see, e.g., [21, 22] ); asynchronous circuits (see, e.g., [7] ); diffusion of innovations, behaviors, and so on, in social networks (see [24, 33] ); interdomain routing [17, 40] ; and congestion control [16] .
ASYNCHRONOUS DYNAMIC INTERACTION
In this section, we present our model of asynchronous dynamic interaction. Intuitively, an interaction system consists of a collection of computational nodes, each capable of selecting actions that are visible to the other nodes. The state of the system at any time consists of each node's current action. Each node has a deterministic reaction function that maps system histories to actions. At every discrete timestep, each node activated by a schedule simultaneously applies its deterministic reaction function to select a new action, which is immediately visible to all other nodes. Definition 3.1. An interaction system is characterized by a tuple (n, A, f ):
• The system has n ∈ Z + computational nodes, labeled 1, . . . , n.
• A = A 1 × · · · × A n , where each A i is a finite set called the action space of node i. A is called the state space of the system, and a state is an n-tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A. A history of the system is a nonempty finite sequence of states, H ∈ A , for some ∈ Z + . The set of all histories is
We now describe the asynchronous dynamics of our model, that is, the ways that a system's state can evolve due to interactions between nodes. Informally, there is some initial state, and, in each discrete time step 1, 2, 3, . . . , a subset of the nodes are activated according to a schedule. The nodes that are activated in a given timestep react simultaneously; each applies its reaction function to the current state to choose a new action. This updated action is immediately observable to all other nodes. 1 
Definition 3.2. Let S ⊆ [n] be a set of nodes. Define the function f
A schedule is a function σ : Z + → 2 [n] that maps each t to a (possibly empty) subset of the computational nodes. 2 If i ∈ σ (t ), then we say that node i is activated at time t.
Since the reaction functions are deterministic, an initial history and a schedule completely determine the resulting infinite state sequence; we call these state sequences trajectories. Definition 3.3 . Let H = (a 0 , . . . , a ) ∈ A + be a history, and let σ be a schedule. The (H , σ )-trajectory of the system is the infinite sequence a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . extending H such that for every t > ,
The history (a 0 , . . . , a t −1 ) is the length-t prefix of the (H , σ )-trajectory.
Fairness and Convergence
Our main theorem is an impossibility result, in which we show that an adversarially chosen initial history and schedule can prevent desirable system behavior. Notice that an arbitrary schedule might never allow some or all nodes to react or might stop activating them after some time. Hence, we limit this adversarial power (thereby strengthening our impossibility result) by restricting our attention to fair schedules, which never permanently stop activating any node.
Definition 3.4.
A fair schedule is a schedule σ that activates each node infinitely many times, that is, for each i ∈ [n], the set {t ∈ Z + : i ∈ σ (t )} is infinite. A fair trajectory is one that is the (H , σ )-trajectory for some history H and some fair schedule σ . Fig. 1 . Shading shows the information about past and current actions available to node 3 at time t given different reaction function restrictions. Left: self-independent. Node 3 can see the entire record of other nodes' past actions, but not its own. The length of this record gives the current timestamp t. Center: 2-recall. Node 3 can see only the two most recent states. Unless the reaction function is stationary, it may also use the value of the current timestamp. Right: self-independent and historyless. Node 3 can only see other nodes' most recent actions and cannot even see the value of the current timestamp.
We are especially interested in whether a system's fair trajectories converge, eventually remaining at a single state forever.
Definition 3.5.
A trajectory a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . converges to a state b if there exists some T ∈ Z + such that, for all t > T , a t = b. The system is convergent if every fair trajectory converges. A state b is a limit state of the system if some fair trajectory converges to b.
Note that it is possible for a trajectory to visit a limit state without converging to that state, meaning that limit states are not necessarily "stable" or "absorbing." They may, however, have basins of attraction, in the sense that reaching certain histories might guarantee convergence to a given limit state.
Definition 3.6.
A history H is committed to a limit state b if, for every fair schedule σ , the (H , σ )-trajectory converges to b. An uncommitted history is one that is not committed to any state.
Informational Restrictions on Reaction Functions
This framework allows for very powerful reaction functions. We now present several possible restrictions on the information they may use. These are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Our main theorem concerns systems in which the reaction functions are self-independent, meaning that each node ignores its own past and present actions when reacting to the system's state. In discussing self-independence, we use the notation
the state space of the system when i is ignored. Similarly, for a state a, a −i ∈ A −i denotes (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ), and given a history H = (a 0 , . . . , a −1 ), we write H −i for (a 0 −i , . . . , a −1 −i ). Using this notation, we formally define self-independence.
A reaction function has bounded recall if it only depends on recent states. Definition 3.8. Given k ∈ Z + and a history H = (a 0 , . . . , a t −1 ) ∈ A t with t ≥ k, the k-history at H is H |k := (a t −k , . . . , a t −1 ), the k-tuple of most recent states. A reaction function f i has k-recall if it only depends on the k-history and the time counter, that is, there exists a function д i :
We sometimes slightly abuse notation by referring to the restricted-domain function д i , rather than f i , as the node's reaction function.
A bounded-recall reaction function is stationary if it also ignores the time counter.
Definition 3.9. We say that a k-recall reaction function is stationary if the time counter t is of no importance. That is, if there exists a function д i : A k → A i such that f i (H ) = д i (H |k ) for every time t ≥ k and history H ∈ A t . A reaction function f i is historyless if f i is both 1-recall and stationary. That is, if f i only depends on the nodes' most recent actions.
While seemingly very restricted, historyless dynamics capture the prominent and extensively studied best-response dynamics from game theory (as we discuss in Section 5.1). We show in Section 5 that historyless dynamics also encompass a host of other applications of interest, ranging from Internet protocols to the adoption of technologies in social network.
GENERAL NON-CONVERGENCE RESULT
We now present our main theorem, a general impossibility result for convergence of nodes' actions under bounded-recall dynamics in asynchronous, distributed computational environments. Theorem 4.1 (Main Theorem). In an interaction system where every reaction function is selfindependent and has bounded recall, the existence of multiple limit states implies that the system is not convergent.
We prove this theorem in Section 4.1 by using a valency argument. In Section 4.2, we show that the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are necessary. We then discuss in Section 4.3 the connections of this work to the famous result of Fischer et al. [15] on the impossibility of resilient consensus.
Note that system convergence is closely related to self-stabilization, which is a guarantee that the system will reach and remaining within a set of legitimate states. For a set L ⊆ A, we say that a system self-stabilizes to L if, for every fair trajectory a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , there is some T ∈ Z + such that, for every t > T , a t ∈ L. In systems satisfying its hypotheses, Theorem 4.1 precludes selfstabilization to any set containing only committed states.
Proof of Main Theorem
In proving this theorem, we use the following sequence of lemmas. We first show in Lemma 4.2 that it is sufficient to consider systems with 1-recall reaction functions. Then, in Lemma 4.3, we argue that such a system can be convergent only if every fair trajectory has no committed prefix. To show the existence of a fair trajectory with no committed prefix, we show that in any such system, uncommitted histories exist (Lemma 4.5) and can be extended to a longer uncommitted histories in a way that activates any given node (Lemma 4.6). This means that committed prefixes can be avoided forever on a trajectory that activates every node infinitely many times, that is, a fair trajectory. Lemma 4.2. If there exists a convergent interaction system with bounded-recall, self-independent reaction functions and multiple limit states, then there is also a convergent interaction system with 1-recall, self-independent reaction functions, and multiple limit states.
Proof. Assume that Γ = (n, A, f ) is a convergent system with self-independent, k-recall reaction functions and multiple limit states, for some k ∈ Z + . Consider a 1-recall system Γ = (n, A , f ),
Informally, a state in Γ is the transpose of a k-history for Γ. The reaction function f i applies f i to this transpose and repeats the output k times. Notice that Γ has self-independent reaction functions. Furthermore, if (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a limit state of Γ, then ((a 1 , . . . , a 1 ), . . . , (a n , . . . , a n )) is a limit state of Γ , so Γ also has multiple limit states. Let σ : Z + → 2 [n] be a fair schedule, and let H ∈ (A k ) be a history of Γ for some ∈ Z + . Define the schedule σ :
Notice that σ is also fair. Let H ∈ A k be the history for Γ formed by concatenating the k-tuples in H . It is easy to see that the (H , σ )-trajectory of Γ converges if and only if the (H , σ )-trajectory of Γ converges. Since we assumed that Γ is convergent, it follows that Γ is also.
Lemma 4.3. Let Γ be a convergent system with self-independent, 1-recall reaction functions. Then every fair trajectory in Γ has a committed finite prefix.
Proof. Assume there exist some history H and fair schedule σ for Γ such that the (H , σ )-trajectory converges to a state a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) but has no committed finite prefix. We will construct a fair schedule σ such that the (H , σ )-trajectory does not converge, giving a contradiction.
Let
Then there is some t 0 ∈ Z + such that u t = a for all t ≥ t 0 . The fairness of σ implies that there is some t 1 > t 0 such that every node is activated by σ between t 0 and t 1 , that is,
is not committed to a, which means there is some time t 2 ≥ t 1 and node i ∈ [n] such that f i (a, t 2 ) a i . The fairness of σ also implies that there is some
We use these facts to iteratively build our fair schedule σ . In the (H , σ )-trajectory v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . , the system will repeatedly enter and exit the state a. First, let σ (t ) = σ (t ) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ t 0 , so v t 0 = a. Define σ (t ) on values t 0 < t ≤ t 2 as follows.
By our choices of t 0 , t 2 , and t 3 , this partial schedule activates every node and induces a segment (v t 0 +1 , . . . , v t 3 ) of the (H , σ )-trajectory such that v t = a whenever t 0 < t < t 2 or t = t 3 , but v t 2 a. Now set t 0 = t 3 , select new t 1 , t 2 , i, and t 3 relative to this t 0 , and iterate this process to define σ (t ) for all values t ∈ Z + . Notice that σ is fair and that the (H , σ )-trajectory v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . does not converge, which contradicts the assumption that the system is convergent. Therefore every fair trajectory in the system must have a committed finite prefix.
We will use the following consequence of self-independence in the course of proving Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. Proof. Let H = (a 0 , . . . , a ) and H = (b 0 , . . . , b ) be committed histories such that, for some i ∈ [n], a −i = b −i , as in Figure 2 . Let σ be any fair schedule such that σ ( + 1) = {i}, and consider the (H , σ )-and (H , σ )-trajectories. When node i is activated, it will choose the same action regardless of whether the history is H or H , by self-independence. As the reaction functions have 1-recall, this means that both these trajectories are identical after time + 1. Thus, since H and H are both committed, they must be committed to the same limit state. Lemma 4.5. Every interaction system with 1-recall, self-independent reaction functions and more than one limit state has at least one uncommitted history.
Proof. Suppose that every history of length one is committed, and consider two such histories (a) = ((a 1 , . . . , a n )) and
. . ,b n )) are committed to the same limit state and therefore that a and b are committed to the same limit state. Thus, all histories of length one must be committed to the same limit state, and it follows that all histories must be committed to the same limit state. This contradicts the system having more than one limit state. Lemma 4.6. Let (n, A, f ) be an interaction system with self-independent, 1-recall reaction functions and more than one limit state, let H = (a 0 , . . . , a −1 ) ∈ A be an uncommitted history, for some ∈ Z + , and let i ∈ [n] be a node. Then there exist some t ≥ and schedule σ such that i ∈ σ (t ) and the length-(t + 1) prefix of the (H , σ )-trajectory is uncommitted.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that no such t and σ exist. Consider all histories that result from activating a set containing i at history H . By assumption, each of these histories is committed. Notice that for all S ⊆ [n] and j ∈ [n], the states f S (H ) and f S ∪{j } (H ) can only differ at coordinate j. Hence, we can iteratively apply Observation 4.4, much as in the proof of Lemma 4.5, to see that all these histories must be committed to the same limit state, which we call b.
Let σ be any fair schedule, and let a 0 , a 1 , . . . be the (H , σ )-trajectory. For each t ∈ Z + , let H t = (a 0 , . . . , a t ), and notice that
, and let I t = (H t −1 , v t ). Since i ∈ σ (t ) ∪ {i}, our assumption implies that each history I t is committed. Let w t = f {i } (H t −1 ), and note that by self-independence, f {i } (I t −1 ) = w t also, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
We now show by induction on t that, for every t ≥ , the history I t is committed to b. This holds for t = by our definition of b. Fix t > , and suppose that I t −1 is committed to b. Then J t is also committed to b. Consider all histories that result from activating a set containing i at history H t −1 . As before, our assumption implies that all these histories are committed, and iterative application of Observation 4.4 shows that they are all committed to the same limit state. In particular, I t must be committed to the same limit state as J t , namely b.
Since σ is a fair schedule, there is some time t for which i ∈ σ (t ). For this t, we have H t = I t , so H t is committed to b. Thus for every fair schedule σ , the (H , σ )-trajectory converges to b, contradicting the assumption that H is uncommitted. We conclude that our assumption was false and that the lemma holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It follows from Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 that, in every system with 1-recall, self-independent reaction functions and multiple limit states, it is be possible to activate each node infinitely many times without ever reaching a committed history. This means that every such system has a fair trajectory with no committed prefix. By Lemma 4.3, this implies that no such system may be convergent. The theorem follows immediately by Lemma 4.2. 3
Tightness of Main Theorem
The following two examples demonstrate that the statement of Theorem 4.1 does not hold if either the self-independence restriction or the bounded-recall restriction is removed.
Example 4.7. The self-independence restriction cannot be removed.
Consider a system with one node, with action space {α, β }. When activated, the node always re-selects its own current action. Observe that the system is convergent despite having two limit states.
Example 4.8. The bounded-recall restriction cannot be removed.
Consider a system with two nodes, 1 and 2, each with the action space {α, β }. The selfindependent reaction functions of the nodes are as follows: Node 2 always chooses node 1's action, node 1 will choose β if node 2's action changed from α to β in the past, and α otherwise. Observe that node 1's reaction function has unbounded recall: it depends on the entire history of interaction. We make the observations that the system is convergent and has two limit states. Observe that if node 1 chooses β at some point in time due to the fact that node 2's action changed from α to β, then it will continue to do so thereafter; if, on the other hand, 1 never does so, then from some point in time onwards, node 1's action is constantly α. In both cases, node 2 will have the same action as node 1 eventually, and thus convergence to one of the two limit states, (α, α ) and (β, β ), is guaranteed. Hence, two limit states exist and the system is convergent nonetheless. Notice also that node 1's reaction functions requires only two states, so the bounded-recall restriction cannot be replaced by a memory restriction.
Connection to Consensus Protocols
We now discuss the relationship of our main result (Theorem 4.1) to the seminal result of Fischer et al. on the impossibility of fault-resilient consensus protocols. The consensus problem is fundamental to distributed computing research. We give a brief description of it here, and we refer the reader to Fischer et al. [15] for a detailed explanation of the model. Fischer et al. studied an environment in which a group of processes, each with an initial value in {0, 1}, communicate with each other via messages. The objective is for all non-faulty processes to eventually agree on some consensus value x ∈ {0, 1}, where x must match the initial value of some process. Fischer et al. established that no consensus protocol is resilient to even a single failure. Their proof of this breakthrough non-termination result introduced the idea of a valency argument.
They showed that there exists some initial configuration that is bivalent, meaning that the resulting consensus could be either 0 and 1 (the outcome depends on the asynchronous schedule of message transmission), and that this bivalence can be maintained. Our proof of Theorem 4.1 also uses a valency argument, where uncommitted histories play the role of bivalent configurations.
Intuitively, the risk of protocol non-termination in the environment studied by Fischer et al. stems from the possibility of failures; a computational node cannot tell whether another node is silent due to a failure or is simply taking a long time to react. Our non-convergence result concerns environments in which nodes/communication channels do not fail. Thus, each node is guaranteed that all other nodes will eventually react. Observe that in such an environment reaching a consensus is easy; one pre-specified node i (the "dictator") waits until it learns all other nodes' inputs (this is guaranteed to happen as failures are impossible) and then selects a value v i and informs all other nodes; then, all other nodes select v i . By contrast, the possibility of non-convergence shown in Theorem 4.1 stems from limitations on nodes' behaviors. Hence, there is no immediate translation from the result of Fischer et al. to ours (and vice versa).
APPLICATIONS: GAMES, CIRCUITS, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND ROUTING
We present implications of our impossibility result, Theorem 4.1, for several well-studied environments: game dynamics, circuit design, social networks, and Internet protocols. For most of these applications, the reaction functions are historyless. Recalling Definition 3.9, this means that they react only to the current state of the system.
Asynchronous Game Dynamics
Traditionally, work in game theory on game dynamics (e.g., best-response dynamics) relies on the explicit or implicit premise that players' behavior is somehow synchronized (in some contexts play is sequential, while in others it is simultaneous). Here, we consider the realistic scenario that there is no computational center than can synchronize players' selection of strategies. We describe these dynamics in the setting of this work and exhibit an impossibility result for best-response, and more general, dynamics.
A game is characterized by a triple (n, S, u). There are n players, 1, . . . , n. Each player i has a strategy set S i . S = S 1 × · · · × S n is the space of strategy profiles s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Each player i has a utility function u i : S → R, where u = (u 1 . . . u n ). Intuitively, player i "prefers" states for which u i is higher. Informally, a player is best responding when it has no incentive to unilaterally change its strategy.
s). A strategy profile s ∈ S is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if every player is best responding at s.
There is a natural relationship between games and the interaction systems described in Section 3. A player with a strategy set corresponds directly to a node with an action space, and a strategy profile may be viewed as a state. These correspondences are so immediate that we often use these terms interchangeably.
Consider the case of best-response dynamics for a game in which best responses are unique (a generic game): Starting from some arbitrary strategy profile, each player chooses its unique best response to other players' strategies when activated. Convergence to pure Nash equilibria under best-response dynamics is the subject of extensive research in game theory and economics, and both positive [32, 38] and negative [21, 22] results are known. If we view each player i in a game (n, S, u) as a node in an interaction system, then under best-response dynamics its utility function u i induces a self-independent historyless reaction function f i : S −i → S i , as long as best responses are unique. Formally,
Conversely, any system with historyless and self-independent reaction functions can be described as following best-response dynamics for a game with unique best responses. Given reaction functions f 1 , . . . , f n , consider the game where each player i's utility function is given by
Best-response dynamics on this game replicate the dynamics induced by those reaction functions. Thus historyless and self-independent dynamics are exactly equivalent to best-response dynamics. Since pure Nash equilibria are fixed points of these dynamics, the historyless case of Theorem 4.1 may be restated in the following form.
Theorem 5.2. If there are two or more pure Nash equilibria in a game with unique best responses, then asynchronous best-response dynamics can potentially oscillate indefinitely.
In fact, best-response dynamics are just one way to derive reaction functions from utility functions, that is, to translate preferences into behaviors. In general, a game dynamics protocol is a mapping from games to systems that makes this translation. Given a game (n, S, u) as input, the protocol selects reaction functions f = ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) and returns an interaction system (n, S, f ). The above non-convergence result holds for a large class of these protocols. In particular, it holds for bounded-recall and self-independent game dynamics, whenever pure Nash equilibria are limit states. When cast into game-theoretic terminology, Theorem 4.1 says that if players' choices of strategies are not synchronized, then the existence of two (or more) pure Nash equilibria implies that this broad class of game dynamics are not guaranteed to reach a pure Nash equilibrium. This result should be contrasted with positive results for such dynamics in the traditional synchronous game-theoretic environments. In particular, this result applies to best-response dynamics with bounded recall and consistent tie-breaking rules (studied by Zapechelnyuk [43] ). Theorem 5.3. If there are two or more pure Nash equilibria in a game with unique best responses, then all bounded-recall self-independent dynamics for which those equilibria are fixed points can fail to converge in asynchronous environments.
Asynchronous Circuits
The implications of asynchrony for circuit design have been extensively studied in computer architecture research [7] . By regarding each logic gate as a node executing an inherently historyless and self-independent reaction function, we show that an impossibility result for stabilization of asynchronous circuits follows from Theorem 4.1.
In this setting there is a Boolean circuit, represented as a directed graph G, in which the vertices represent the circuit's inputs and logic gates, and the edges represent the circuit's connections. The activation of the logic gates is asynchronous. That is, the gates' outputs are initialized in some arbitrary way, and then the update of each gate's output, given its inputs, is uncoordinated and unsynchronized. A stable Boolean assignment in this framework is an assignment of Boolean values to the circuit inputs and the logic gates that is consistent with each gate's truth table. We say that a Boolean circuit is inherently stable if it is guaranteed to converge to a stable Boolean assignment regardless of the initial Boolean assignment.
To show how Theorem 4.1 applies to this setting, we model an asynchronous circuit with a fixed input as a historyless interaction system with self-independent reaction functions. Every node in the system has action space {0, 1}. There is a node for each input vertex, which has a constant (and thus self-independent) reaction function. For each logic gate, the system includes a node whose reaction function implements the logic gate on the actions of the nodes corresponding to its inputs. If any gate takes its own output directly as an input, then we model this using an additional identity gate; this means that all reaction functions are self-independent. Since every stable Boolean assignment corresponds to a limit state of this system, this instability result follows from Theorem 4.1: Theorem 5.4. If two or more stable Boolean assignments exist for an asynchronous Boolean circuit with a given input, then that asynchronous circuit is not inherently stable on that input.
Diffusion of Technologies in Social Networks
Understanding the ways in which innovations, ideas, technologies, and practices disseminate through social networks is fundamental to the social sciences. We consider the classic economic setting [33] (which has lately also been approached by computer scientists [24] ) where each decision maker has two technologies {X , Y } to choose from and wishes to have the same technology as the majority of its "friends" (neighboring nodes in the social network). We exhibit a general asynchronous instability result for this environment.
In this setting there is a social network of users, represented by a connected graph in which users are the vertices and edges correspond to friendship relationships. There are two competing technologies, X and Y . Each user will repeatedly reassess his or her choice of technology, at timesteps separated by arbitrary finite intervals. When this happens, the user will select X if at least half of his or her friends are using X and otherwise select Y . A "stable global state" is a fixed point of these choice functions, meaning that no user will ever again switch technologies. Observe that if every user has chosen X or every user has chosen Y , then the system is in a stable global state.
The dynamics of this diffusion can be described as asynchronous best-response dynamics for the game in which each player's utility is 1 if his or her choice of technology is consistent with the majority (with ties broken in favor of X ) and 0 otherwise. This game has unique best responses, and the strategy profiles (X , . . . , X ) and (Y , . . . , Y ) are both pure Nash equilibria for this game. Thus Theorem 5.2 implies the following result.
Theorem 5.5. In every social network with at least one edge, the diffusion of technologies can potentially oscillate indefinitely.
Interdomain Routing
Interdomain routing is the task of establishing routes between the smaller networks, or autonomous systems (ASes), that make up the Internet. It is handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We abstract a recent result of Sami et al. [40] concerning BGP non-convergence and show that this result extends to several BGP-based multipath routing protocols that have been proposed in the past few years.
In the standard model for analyzing BGP dynamics [17] , there is a network of source ASes that wish to send traffic to a unique destination AS d. Each AS i has a ranking function < i that specifies i's strict preferences over all simple (loop-free) routes leading from i to d. Each AS also has an export policy that specifies which routes it is willing to make available to each neighboring AS. Under BGP, each AS constantly selects the "best" route that is available to it (see [17] for more details). BGP safety, that is, guaranteed convergence to a stable routing outcome, is a fundamental desideratum that has been the subject of extensive work in both the networking and the standards communities. We now cast interdomain routing into the terminology of Section 3 to obtain a nontermination results for BGP as a corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Each AS acts as a computational node. The action space of each node i is the set of all simple routes from i to the destination d, together with the empty route ∅. For every state (R 1 , . . . , R n ) of the system, i's reaction function f i considers the set of routes S = {(i, j)R j : j is i's neighbor and R j is exportable to i}. If S is empty, then f i returns ∅. Otherwise, f i selects the route in S that is optimal with respect to < i . Observe that this reaction function is deterministic, self-independent, and historyless and that a stable routing tree is a limit state of this system. Thus Theorem 4.1 implies the following result of Sami et al. Importantly, the asynchronous model of Section 3 is significantly more restrictive than that of Sami et al., so the result implied by Theorem 4.1 is stronger. Theorem 4.1 implies an even more general non-safety result for routing protocols that depend on ASes that act self-independently and with bounded recall. In particular, this includes recent proposals for BGP-based multi-path routing protocols that allow each AS to send traffic along multiple routes, for example, R-BGP [28] and Neighbor-Specific BGP (NS-BGP) [41] .
Congestion Control
We now consider the fundamental task of congestion control in communication networks, which is achieved through a combination of mechanisms on end-hosts (e.g., TCP) and on switches/routers (e.g., RED and WFQ). We briefly describe the model of congestion control studied by Godfrey et al. [16] .
There is a network of routers, represented by a directed graph G, in which vertices represent routers, and edges represent communication links. Each edge e has capacity c e . There are n sourcetarget pairs of vertices (s i , t i ), termed "connections," that represent communicating pairs of endhosts. Each source-target pair (s i , t i ) is connected via some fixed route, R i . Each source s i transmits at a constant rate γ i > 0. 4 For each of a router's outgoing edges, the router has a queue management, or queuing, policy, that dictates how the edge's capacity should be allocated between the connections whose routes traverse that edge. The network is asynchronous, so routers' queuing decisions can be made simultaneously. An equilibrium of the network is a global configuration of edges' capacity allocation such that the incoming and outgoing flows on each edge are consistent with the queuing policy for that edge. Godfrey et al. show that, while one might expect flow to be received at a constant rate whenever it is transmitted at a constant rate, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, Godfrey et al. present examples in which connections' throughputs can potentially fluctuate ad infinitum, never converging an equilibrium.
We model such a network as a historyless interaction system to show that every network with multiple equilibria can oscillate indefinitely. The computational nodes of the system are the edges. The action space of each edge e intuitively consists of all possible ways to divide traffic going through e between the connections whose routes traverse e. More formally, for every edge e, let N (e) be the number connections whose paths go through e. Then e's action space is A e = {(x 1 , . . . , x N (e ) ) : each x i ≥ 0 and Σ i x i ≤ c e }. We assume that the x i have bounded precision, meaning that the state space is finite.
Edge e's reaction function f e models the queuing policy according to which e's capacity is shared: For every N (e)-tuple of nonnegative incoming flows (w 1 , . . . ,w N (e ) ), f e outputs an action (x 1 , . . . , x N (e ) ) ∈ A e such that for every i ∈ [N (e)], x i ≤ w i -a connection's flow leaving the edge cannot exceed its flow entering the edge. These reaction functions are historyless and self-independent, and an equilibrium of the network is a limit state of this system. Using Theorem 4.1, then, we can obtain the following impossibility result. Theorem 5.7. If there are multiple capacity-allocation equilibria in the network, then dynamics of congestion control can potentially oscillate indefinitely.
COMPLEXITY OF ASYNCHRONOUS DYNAMICS
We now turn to the communication complexity and computational complexity of determining whether a system is convergent. We present hardness results in both models of computation even for the case of historyless interaction. Our computational complexity result shows that even if nodes' reaction functions can be succinctly represented, determining whether the system is convergent is PSPACE-complete. Alongside its computational implications, this intractability result implies that (unless PSPACE ⊆ NP) we cannot hope to have short, efficiently verifiable certificates that guarantee a system's convergence.
Communication Complexity
The following result shows that, in general, determining whether a system is convergent cannot be done efficiently. We now present a reduction from 2-party set disjointness to the question of determining whether a system with historyless and self-independent reaction functions is convergent. Given an instance Disj q (A, B), we construct a system with n nodes, each with two actions, as follows. (The relation between the parameters q and n is to be specified later.) Let the action space of each node be {0, 1}. We now define the reaction functions of the nodes. Consider the possible action profiles of nodes 3, . . . , n, that is, the set {0, 1} n−2 . Observe that this set of actions profiles is the (n − 2)-hypercube Q n−2 , and thus can be visualized as the graph whose vertices are indexed by the binary (n − 2)-tuples and such that two vertices are adjacent if and only if they differ in exactly one coordinate. The reaction functions are based on following a snake in this hypercube.
Let S be a maximal snake in Q n−2 , and let q = |S |. We now show our reduction from Disj q . We identify each element j ∈ [q] with a unique vertex v j ∈ S. Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 n−2 is on S. For ease of exposition we also assume that 1 n−2 is not on S. (Getting rid of this assumption is easy.) Orient the edges in S to form a cycle. For any edge that has exactly one endpoint in S, orient the edge toward S. An example is given in Figure 4 . Orient all other edges arbitrarily. For each i = 3, . . . , n, this orientation induces a function д i : Q n−2 → {0, 1}, where д i (a 3 , . . . , a n ) is determined by the direction of the edge {(a 3 , . . .
The nodes' self-independent and historyless reaction functions are as follows. f 1 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = 0 ifa 2 = 1 and (a 3 , . . . , a n ) = v j for some j ∈ A 1 otherwise , f 2 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = 0 ifa 1 = 1 and (a 3 , . . . , a n ) = v j for some j ∈ B 1 otherwise ,
Informally, the aim is for nodes 3, . . . , n to follow the snake S to vertices corresponding to each value j ∈ [q].
Observation 6.4. 1 n is the unique limit state of the system.
In our reduction Alice simulates node 1 (whose reaction function is based on A), Bob simulates node 2 (whose reaction function is based on B), and one of the two parties simulates all other nodes (whose reaction functions are based on neither A nor B). The theorem now follows from the combination of the following two claims. Proof. Suppose that from some moment forth it is never the case that both node 1 and 2's actions are 0. Observe that from that time onwards the nodes 3, . . . , n will always choose the action 1 when activated. Hence, after some time has passed the actions of all nodes in {3, . . . , n} will be 1. Observe that whenever nodes 1 and 2 are activated thereafter they shall choose the action 1, so we have convergence to the limit state 1 n . Claim 6.6. The system is convergent iff A ∩ B = ∅.
Proof. If A ∩ B ∅, then initialize the system to a state (0, 0, a 3 , . . . , a n ), where (a 3 , . . . , a n ) = v 1 . Consider a schedule that activates {3, . . . , n} in every timestep until (a 3 , . . . , a n ) = v j for some j ∈ A ∩ B. When that happens, the schedule activates {1, 2} for two consecutive timesteps, then resumes activating {3, . . . , n}. The functions д i ensure that, for each j ∈ [q], the vector (a 3 , . . . , a n ) will be equal to v j within a finite number of timesteps. Since there is some j ∈ A ∩ B, nodes 1 and 2 will eventually be activated, so this schedule is fair. This initial state and schedule clearly produce an oscillation, so the system is not convergent in this case. Now assume for contradiction that A ∩ B = ∅ and the system is not convergent. We know from Claim 6.5 that if there is an oscillation, then there are infinitely many time steps in which both node 1 and 2's actions are 0. We argue that this implies that there must be infinitely many time steps in which both nodes select action 0 simultaneously. Indeed, node 1 only chooses action 0 if node 2's action is 1, and vice versa, and so if both nodes never choose 0 simultaneously, then it is never the case that both nodes' actions are 0 at the same time step, a contradiction. Now, when is it possible for both 1 and 2 to choose 0 at the same time? Observe that this can only be if the actions of nodes 3, . . . , n constitute an element that is in both A and B. Hence, A ∩ B ∅, another contradiction.
We have reduced Disj q (A, B), which requires Ω(q) bits of communication, to the problem of checking convergence of an n-node system with historyless and self-independent reaction functions. As q was defined as the length of a maximal snake in Q n , a classical combinatorial result due to Evdokimov shows that q = Ω(2 n ).
Theorem 6.7 (Evdokimov [12] ). Let z ∈ Z + be sufficiently large. Then, the size |S | of a maximal snake in the z-hypercube Q z is at least λ2 z for some λ > 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Computational Complexity
The above communication complexity hardness result required the representation of the reaction functions to (potentially) be exponentially long. What if the reaction functions can be succinctly described? We now present a strong computational complexity hardness result for the case that each reaction function f i is historyless and is given explicitly in the form of a Boolean circuit. Theorem 6.8. When the reaction functions are given as Boolean circuits, determining whether a historyless system with n nodes is convergent is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Our proof is based on the proof of Fabrikant and Papadimitriou [13] that checking BGP safety is PSPACE-complete. Importantly, that result does not imply Theorem 6.8, since the model of asynchronous interaction considered in that work does not allow for simultaneous activation of nodes. We prove our theorem by reduction from the problem of determining whether a linear space-bounded Turing machine (TM) will halt from every starting configuration.
For n ∈ Z + , let M be a TM that can only access the first n tape cells. Let Q be M's machine state space, Γ its tape alphabet, and δ : Q × Γ → Q × Γ × {−1, 0, 1} its transition function. A configuration of M is a triple (q, a, j) , where q ∈ Q is a machine state, a ∈ Γ n describes the tape contents, and j ∈ [n] gives the location of the control head.
Then we say that M, 1 n is in shc (for space-bounded halting from all configurations) if, for every configuration, M will halt if it begins its computation from that configuration. As Fabrikant and Papadimitriou [13] argue, the problem of checking whether a space-bounded TM will accept a blank input is reducible to shc, and thus shc is PSPACE-hard.
We now reduce shc to the problem of determining whether a historyless interaction system is convergent. Given n ∈ Z + and a TM M that can only access the first n tape cells, we construct a historyless system that is convergent if and only if M, 1 n is in shc. The system has a cell node for each of the first n tape cells and a head node to represent the control head. The cell nodes 1, . . . , n each have the action space Γ, and the head node n + 1 has action space Q × Γ × [n] × {−1, 0, 1}. For a ∈ Γ n , each cell node i ∈ [n] has the reaction function f i (a, (q, γ , j, d )) = γ if i = j a i otherwise.
For the head node, f n+1 (a, (q, γ , j, d )) is given by the following procedure:
Observe that (a, (q, γ , j, d )) is a limit state of this system if and only if q is a halting machine state for M. Suppose the system is convergent, and let (q, a, j) be a configuration of M. Consider the system trajectory that begins at state (a, (q, a j , j, 0)) and follows the schedule that activates every node in every round. This trajectory will reach a limit state, and it corresponds directly to a halting run of M that begins from (q, a, j), so M, 1 n is in shc.
Conversely, suppose that M, 1 n is in shc, and let (a, (q, γ , j, d )) be a system state. Suppose that a j = γ . Then consider the computation by M that begins at configuration (q, a, j ), where j = min{max{j + d, 1}, n}. This computation will reach a halting machine state, and any fair trajectory from (a, (q, γ , j, d )) will go through the same sequence of machine states as this computation, which means that the trajectory will converge to a limit state. If a j γ , then the system state will remain the same until j is activated and takes action γ , after which the above argument applies. Thus the system is convergent. We conclude that checking whether the system is convergent is PSPACE-hard. Since it is straightforward to check convergence in polynomial space, this problem is PSPACE-complete.
In a preliminary version of this work [25] , we conjectured that the above PSPACE-completeness result also holds for the case of self-independent reaction functions. Conjecture 6.9. Determining whether a system with n nodes, each with a deterministic selfindependent and historyless reaction function, is convergent is PSPACE-complete.
This conjecture has since been proved by Engelberg et al. [11] .
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this article, we have taken the first steps towards a complete understanding of strategic dynamics in distributed settings. We proved a general non-convergence result and several hardness results within this model. We also discussed some important aspects such as the implications of fairness and randomness, as well as applications to a variety of settings. We believe that we have only scratched the surface in the exploration of the convergence properties of game dynamics in distributed computational environments, and many important questions remain wide open. We now outline several interesting directions for future research.
Other limitations, convergence notions, and equilibria. We have considered particular limitations on reaction functions, modes of convergence, and kinds of equilibria. Understanding the effects of asynchrony on different classes of reaction functions (e.g., uncoupled dynamics, dynamics with outdated information) and for other types of convergence (e.g., of the empirical distributions of play) and equilibria (e.g., mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria) is a broad and challenging direction for future research.
Other notions of asynchrony. We believe that better understanding the role of degrees of fairness, randomness, and other restrictions on schedules from distributed computing literature, in achieving convergence to equilibrium points is an interesting and important research direction.
Characterizing asynchronous convergence. We still lack characterizations of asynchronous convergence even for simple dynamics (e.g., deterministic and historyless). Our PSPACE -completeness result in Section 6 eliminates the possibility of short witnesses of guaranteed asynchronous convergence unless PSPACE ⊆ NP, but elegant characterizations are still possible.
Topological and knowledge-based approaches. Topological [4, 23, 39] and knowledgebased [19] approaches have been very successful in addressing fundamental questions in distributed computing. Can these approaches shed new light on the implications of asynchrony for strategic dynamics?
Further exploring the environments of Section 5. We have applied our main non-convergence result to the environments described in Section 5. These environments are of independent interest and are indeed the subject of extensive research. Hence, the further exploration of dynamics in these settings is important.
